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Soviet Legacies of Economic Development, Oligarchic Rule and Electoral Quality in 
Eastern Europe’s Partial Democracies: The Case of Ukraine1 
Tomila Lankina and Alexander Libman 




Can economic development retard democracy, defying expectations of classic modernization 
theorizing? If so, under what conditions? Our paper addresses the puzzle of poor democratic 
performance in highly urbanized and industrialized post-communist states. We assembled an 
original dataset with data from Ukraine’s local and national elections and constructed district- 
(rayon) and region- (oblast) level indices of electoral quality. Regions and districts that score 
higher on developmental indices also score lower on electoral quality, including in Ukraine’s 
Western regions conventionally considered more democratic than the predominantly Russian-
speaking Eastern regions. We explain these outcomes with reference to the peculiarities of 
Soviet industrial development, which facilitated the emergence of “oligarchs” in territories 
housing Soviet-era mega-industries. Our research contributes to comparative debates about the 




Can economic development retard democracy, defying expectations of classic modernization 
theorizing?2 If so, under what conditions? Several prominent studies have recently sought to 
nuance the development-democracy axiom.3 Adam Przeworski et al. have for instance 
postulated that while the level of economic development is a poor predictor of transitions to 
democracy, once established, democracy is more likely to survive in wealthier countries.4 One 
group of nations in particular—Europe’s formerly communist countries—have contributed to 
the generation of ambivalence regarding the co-variance between economic development—a 
conventional proxy for modernization—and democracy. As David Epstein et al.’s study 
illustrates, many of the formerly communist “partial democracies” show comparatively high 
levels of industrial development, urbanization and per capita GDP.5 Not only would classic 
modernization theorizing predict that these countries would democratize6—as they did in the 
1980s-1990s—but, in line with Przeworski et al.’s reformulation of the modernization 
paradigm, we would expect democracy, once established, to be more likely to survive there.7 
And yet, after the initial euphoria surrounding post-communist “democratic transitions,” many 
formerly communist states have fallen into a grey zone between democracy and 
authoritarianism.8 
 Our paper seeks to address the puzzle of poor democratic performance and democratic 
backsliding in highly urbanized and industrialized post-communist contexts. We argue that 
rather than being propitious for democracy, industrial legacies of a socialist planned economy 
could in fact have adverse effects on democratic consolidation and resilience over time. 
Specifically, we demonstrate that it is precisely territories that had been targeted for rapid 
industrial development under communism that may be more vulnerable to authoritarian 
tendencies in the post-communist period. In making this argument, we join influential 
scholarship on communist legacies.9 We extend this research by systematically exploring the 
links between Soviet-era industries and variations in electoral quality in Ukraine’s sub-national 
regions. Our sub-national methodological strategy allows us to circumvent the issue of small-n 
in cross-national analyses, which plagues rigorous analysis of the drivers of anomalous 
outcomes in post-communist “partial democracies.” Our analysis of district- and regional-level 
electoral data indeed demonstrates that regions, which achieved higher levels of economic 
development during the Soviet era, have also featured elections that are less competitive. We 
explain these outcomes with reference to the peculiarities of Soviet industrial development, 
which facilitated the emergence of “oligarchs” in territories housing Soviet-era mega-
industries. Although other researchers have discussed the oligarchs’ meddling in the electoral 
process,10 ours is the first systematic attempt to link oligarchic influence over regional 
economies to sub-national electoral quality.  
For our analysis, we have assembled an original dataset with electoral data from 
Ukraine’s recent local elections and from past electoral cycles. We construct indices of sub-
national electoral quality at both the region (oblast) and district (rayon) levels. We find support 
for conventional West-East expectations of regional patterns of sub-national political variations 
in Ukraine.11 Yet, we also observe that regions and districts that score higher on developmental 
indices, notably urbanization, score lower on electoral quality, including in Ukraine’s Western 
regions which usually feature in the literature as being more democratic than the predominantly 
Russian-speaking Eastern regions; these results hold when we control for cultural differences 
across regions.  
 
 
Theoretical framework  
 
Daniel Lerner proposed the “modernization” paradigm of developmental progression from 
“traditional” rural societies to “modern” economically developed urban industrial societies.12 
In turn, Seymour Martin Lipset famously postulated that economic development—and the 
inter-connected processes of industrialization, urbanization and education—are conducive to 
the development and spread of democracy among nations.13 Although many cross-national 
studies have since restated the modernization paradigm,14 other scholars have problematized 
the assumptions animating this research. For instance, Guillermo O’Donnell postulated that in 
Latin America, economic development at a particular stage may lead to a “bureaucratic 
authoritarian,” rather than a democratic, type of regime.15 And Tatu Vanhanen has discussed 
how even in relatively developed economies, a high degree of concentration of non-agricultural 
economic sectors “in the hands of one group, whatever that group is,” could impinge on 
democracy.16 Recent research has also highlighted the importance of factoring in economic 
asset structure which may be more or less conducive to democratization;17 the predominance 
of petrochemicals as a key source of national revenue;18 and the incentives of elites controlling 
important economic resources to support or block democratic change.19 These insights, while 
sensitive to both the elite and mass citizen preferences, shift emphasis away from the attitudinal 
dimension of democratic change to the structural-institutional contexts in which development 
occurs.  
The structural insights in the modernization debate are particularly relevant in the 
context of mixed evidence about development-democracy links in post-communist countries. 
One of the most systematic attempts at highlighting the extent to which these states stand out 
in violating the assumptions about democratic resilience among relatively developed nations is 
the 2006 study by David Epstein et al. Employing a range of cross-national data, Epstein et al. 
argue that to the extent that these regimes defy predictions about the links between economic 
development and democratic resilience, they remain among the most “poorly understood”20 
type of regime and should therefore constitute the focus of analytical inquiry in democracy 
theorizing. Joining other analysts of “hybrid” regimes,21 Epstein et al. highlight the disjuncture 
between the existence of formal institutions providing for electoral turnover, and informal 
practices that undermine the meaningfulness of these mechanisms of democratic contestation 
in post-communist “partial democracies.” They define “partial democracies” as those “which 
possess some, but not all, of the properties that characterize full democracies”.22 “In partial 
democracies,” they write, “the chief executive may be elected, but then face weak constraints; 
and his selection may not result from open and organized competition, but rather from lobbying 
by a politicized military or from selection by a committee of a ruling party. Alternatively, the 
election itself could be uncompetitive, either because of political manipulation by the 
authorities or because political parties were highly factionalized”. 23 
 We applaud Epstein et al. for highlighting how regime types in comparatively developed 
post-communist contexts do not always meet the expectations of the classic modernization 
paradigm,24 and indeed of recent reformulation of the modernization-democracy axiom.25 
Nevertheless, we attribute their ambivalent findings to the conceptual confusion between 
economic development and modernization. Epstein et al. critique the statistical analysis of 
Przeworski et al.,26 specifically the computation of standard errors in evaluating the effect of 
modernization proxies on transition from authoritarianism to democracy and the 
appropriateness of a dichotomous definition of regime types (autocracy and democracy) as 
distinct from a trichotomous definition, which includes “partial democracies.” Employing 
alternative statistical procedures and measures to those employed in the Przeworski et al. study, 
they find that high GDP per capita increases both the likelihood of transition to democracy and 
of subsequent democratic consolidation. They do show, however, that for “partial 
democracies,” conventional modernization proxies fail to predict higher likelihood of transition 
into another regime type.  
Epstein et al.’s key measure of “modernization” is per capita GDP. Among the other 
“standard” modernization indicators employed in their statistical analysis are “year-to-year 
GDP growth, the percent of the population living in cities, and log of population density”.27 
The underlying assumption behind the employment of these measures is very much in line with 
the broad expectations of the classic modernization paradigm. Specifically, GDP growth and 
urbanization are regarded as inter-connected with a bundle of developmental processes, notably 
the diversification of modern forms of production and of economic sectors; workforce 
emancipation; and broader attitudinal changes among citizens which are ultimately conducive 
to democracy.28 These indicators are routinely employed in cross-country statistical tests of 
modernization theory; the debates in the literature are usually about whether these proxies 
produce different results rather than whether they have good internal validity in all settings, that 
is, whether they are indeed associated with modernization as theorized and as conceptualized 
in classic modernization scholarship.29 
We find the assumptions about the internal validity of modernization measures like GDP 
and urbanization problematic in countries with a legacy of state-led socialism. Instead, we 
highlight the structural underpinnings of communist development that may have detrimental 
effects on democracy even in industrialized, urbanized and high human capital settings. 
Specifically, we link Soviet economic legacies to the vulnerability of the electorate to 
“workforce mobilization”30 and other electoral pressures by powerful economic tycoons 
competing for political power at regional and national levels. Jon Elster, Claus Offe and Ulrich 
Preuss point to the significant distortion of communist economies in favor of “over 
industrialization” and away from services.31 Bela Greskovits discusses the persistence of large 
vertically integrated, highly specialized and spatially concentrated industries—what he terms 
the “inherited sector” and the “lasting impact” of these legacies on post-socialist economic 
development.32 Because Soviet planners sought to avoid “wasteful” duplication of resources 
originating from market competition, locking producers into a supplier arrangement with a 
particular consumer,33 Soviet industry exhibited a much higher level of asset specificity than 
would a company in comparable sectors in a market economy.34  
Accelerated industrial development contributed to rapid urbanization which however 
did not necessarily lead to the kind of diffuse, diverse and emancipated workforce that features 
in classic modernization theorizing. Consider the example of the city of Novokuznetsk, one of 
the oldest cities in Siberia, founded in 1618. In 1926 it had a population of 4,000; by 1939 it 
boasted a population of 166,000 due to rapid development of the metals and mining industries. 
In the post-Soviet period, Novokuznetsk’s workforce continued to be heavily dependent on 
giant industrial plants, for instance, the Novokuznetsk Aluminum Plant, which attracted 
notoriety as a site of “oligarchic wars” in the 1990s.35 Soviet industrial hubs often featured high 
concentration of qualified specialists in engineering and science. Yet, the highly educated 
workforce remained dependent on employment in specific enterprises, even after communism 
collapsed.36 Soviet planners celebrated loyalty to one enterprise and local “workers’ 
dynasties”.37 Niche specialization reduced the portability of skills. Limited flexibility built into 
Soviet-era housing ownership and the provision of social benefits through enterprises further 
reduced workers’ ability to emancipate themselves from their employers.38 As Grzegorz Ekiert 
and Stephen Hanson wrote, the “planned heroism” of Stalinist planning “left older workers and 
managers with few valuable skills enabling them to compete effectively in a genuinely 
competitive market context”.39 
Communist states’ economies of scarcity contributed to the generation of powerful 
informal networks of managers and planners who will be well placed to consolidate control 
over enterprises and their workforce after communism collapsed.40  Joseph Berliner’s account 
of Soviet industrial management revealed that already at the height of Stalinism, the corruption, 
economy of favors (blat) and informalities that we associate with the era of stagnation of the 
1970s-1980s and with post-soviet economic development41 were not only widespread but were 
in fact intrinsic to the logic of a centrally-planned economy.42 For many a manger, the only way 
to meet unrealistically high targets was to develop a web of informal exchange of favors 
involving superiors in the various planning bodies, the party apparat and the horizontal chain 
of suppliers. And, to maintain workforce loyalty and enthusiasm, the manager was to provide 
in-kind support in the form of tourist vouchers, scarce consumer goods, and access to “elite” 
sanatoria or health spas.43 As Ken Jowitt wrote, “in Leninist regimes, the factory was (is) less 
a specialized institution and school of modernity than a functionally diffuse neopatriarchical 
provider: of houses, vacations, medical attention, food, and to some extent social activity for its 
workers . . . [with] each institution attempt[ing] to replicate the self-sufficiency of all the 
others”.44  
Henry Hale’s analysis of post-communist “patronal politics” highlights the connection 
between these pervasive legacies of state socialist planning and electoral processes. Hale 
defines patronal politics as “politics in societies where individuals organize their political and 
economic pursuits primarily around the personalized exchange of concrete rewards and 
punishments through chains of actual acquaintance, and not primarily around abstract, 
impersonal principles such as ideological belief or categorizations like economic class that 
include many people one has not actually met in person.” These rewards and punishments are 
meted out through “hierarchical networks” organized around local political machines; large 
“corporate conglomerates” and the state / public sector.45  Although these insights broadly 
dovetail with research into “clientelism” in other contexts,46 Hale and, in another study, Frye 
et. al. nuance conventional expectations of clientelism scholarship.47 Although small rural 
electorates often facilitate the monitoring of electoral compliance,48 in post-Soviet states large 
companies with a sizeable workforce benefit from the “economies of scale” of vote rallying, 
they argue.49 In a survey of industrial workforce conducted around the time of Russia’s 2011 
parliamentary elections, Frye et al. find that 25 percent of employees reported pressure from 
employers to turn out to vote. “The workplace,” they write, “is a key locus of voter mobilization 
for the regime”.50 
Similar processes have been observed in Ukraine, where workers in Soviet-era 
industries have been characterized as a “silent majority.”51 Ukraine, in fact, stands out among 
post-Soviet “patronal” regimes in that here a small group of tycoons known as “oligarchs”—
insofar as their “networks extend[ed] far beyond business and ran deep into politics”52—have 
tended to compete for power relying on the mechanisms of worker mobilization described 
above. In 2011, for example, employees of two steel giants in Mariupol in Donetsk region 
(MMK Ilyicha and Azovstal’) reported being pressured to join the Party of the Regions—
arguably one of the most effective Ukrainian political machines supporting the president Viktor 
Yanukovych (2010-2014)—under threat of being fired. Membership applications were 
distributed on the shop floor; membership fees were to be deducted from workers’ salaries.53 
After the story became public, the Metinvest Group—the owner of both plants controlled by 
the oligarch Rinat Akhmetov—publicly prohibited this form of political agitation in the plant.54 
However, the critical role of the plant in the life of Mariupol persisted, even after the 2014 
Revolution of Dignity and the start of the war in Donbass. During the 2015 local elections, the 
plant press and radio have been highly vocal in favor of the Opposition Bloc candidate, a 
movement backed by Akhmetov. Heads of factory shops were to ensure that workers show up 
at polling stations. The newspaper Ukrainskaya Pravda quoted an interview conducted at one 
of the polling stations, which illustrates electoral compliance. When asked for which party the 
respondent planned to cast a vote, he replied: “We are voting for our plants. For whom else?”55 
 
Illustrative case study: The region of Dnipropetrovsk 
 
The region and city of Dnipropetrovsk (currently Dnipro), which in our analysis (presented 
below) emerges as the least “democratic” of Ukrainian regions, provides an illustration of the 
mechanisms at work linking Soviet-era development to poor electoral quality. It illustrates the 
processes of the construction of oligarchic power structures at the regional level, and how these 
structures have the potential to negatively affect regional democratic processes.  
Dnipropetrovsk, founded as Ekaterinoslav at the end of the 18th century, is a city in 
south-central Ukraine, located at a distance of some 391 kilometers from Kiev. By the end of 
the 19th century, Ekaterinoslav was already the fifth largest center of manufacturing in Russia, 
boasting scores of factories and family-run artisanal enterprises.56 The Bolsheviks further 
developed the city’s industry. Already in the 1950s, Dnipropetrovsk became one of the USSR’s 
most strategically important cities.57 It housed the USSR’s largest nuclear missiles plant, as 
well as other major military-industrial complex facilities, notably those related to ferrous metals 
and industrial pipes production; machine-building—it was home to the industrial giants of 
Yuzhmash and the Dnipropetrovsk Machine-Building Plant—; the production of metallurgical 
and mining equipment, hydraulic presses and train cars. Pursuant to a KGB order, 
Dnipropetrovsk became a closed city in 1959. It famously concentrated the cream of Ukraine’s 
and USSR’s scientific, engineering and technical cadre; this followed Stalin’s decision that it 
would serve as a country-wide hub for the training of highly qualified rocket construction 
specialists. Although Dnipropetrovsk’s ethnic make-up had been overwhelmingly Ukrainian, 
by the 1950s, over 33 percent of the city’s Ukrainians considered Russian to be their native 
language.58 The Soviet-era enterprises have continued to define the region and city’s economic 
landscape and fortunes. Currently, Dnipropetrovsk oblast ranks third after Kharkiv and 
Zaporizhia in the regional economy’s share of metals- and machine-building production. 
Already in the Soviet period, powerful networks emerged linking Dnipropetrovsk’s party and 
managerial elite to the USSR and the Ukrainian Republic’s power center in Kiev, and these 
links persisted in the post-Soviet period.59 Writes Sergei Zhuk:  
 
It became the launching pad for the political careers of many Soviet politicians 
in Moscow because of its close association with the clan of Leonid Brezhnev. . 
. Before perestroika, more than 53 percent of all the political leaders in Kyiv had 
come from Dniepropetrovsk; by 1996, some 80 percent of post-Soviet Ukrainian 
politicians had begun their careers in this city. The overwhelming majority of 
these representatives of the “Dniepropetrovsk Family” (including Leonid 
Kuchma, a former president of post-Soviet Ukraine, and Yulia Tymoshenko, a 
heroine of the “Orange Revolution” of 2004) started their careers during the late 
socialist period in the factories of the closed city’s military-industrial complex.60 
 
Andrew Wilson writes that the origins of the powerful regional political machines could 
be traced to the early 1990s, when the so-called “‘red director’ elite. . . had taken advantage of 
the chaotic conditions of the early 1990s to enrich themselves, trading in subsidized exports 
and exploiting price controls.”61 These managers were instrumental in propelling Leonid 
Kuchma, who had been director of the industrial giant Dnipropetrovsk missile plant, and was 
by 1992 Ukraine’s Prime Minister, to Ukraine’s Presidency.62 They did so by staging industrial 
action in Eastern Ukraine to prompt early elections and to dislodge Ukraine’s first president 
Leonid Kravchuk.63 Wilson writes that Kuchma “parceled out control of Ukraine’s heavy 
industry to the rival regional ‘clans’.” In Dnipropetrovsk it was piping and petrochemicals, 
while in Donbas it was coal and steel; in Kharkiv it was engineering; and, in the Crimea it was 
the hospitality and tourism industry.64 Even in the brief period following the Orange Revolution 
of 2004 and until 2010, when Ukraine became the only non-Baltic country to be rated by the 
US agency Freedom House as fully “free,” that same agency, in its Nations in Transit report, 
noted that while there were significant improvements in the electoral process and media 
independence during that time, there had been “no significant improvement in levels of 
corruption and governance, reflecting that politics and society remained highly personalistic. . 
.”65 Writes Hale: “What had changed after the Orange Revolution was not the level of 
patronalism in politics, but the arrangement of patronal networks, which had collectively taken 
on more open and competitive rather than closed configurations.”66 Regional “virtual politics”67 
involved media control and manipulation by rival oligarchic groupings; manipulation of the 
electorate which derived its livelihoods from the industrial giants that the oligarchs controlled; 
citizen mobilization to support political candidates by financing street rallies; and plain old-
fashioned ballot-stuffing by loyal regional clients.68 
These patterns were in evidence in the context of the Petro Poroshenko presidency and 
the 2015 local elections. Following the conflict with Poroshenko in 2015, Igor Kolomoyskiy, 
who had been earlier appointed as governor of Dnipropetrovsk and who possessed significant 
influence over the local economy—notably control over the part state-owned Ukrnafta gas 
processing enterprise—was forced to resign. The accusation that Poroshenko levelled against 
Kolomoysky was that he abused his position as governor to expand his business empire in the 
region and in particular to attempt to establish control over the struggling Yuzhmash industrial 
giant.69 In what Kolomoyskiy described as part of a “raider attack” in March 2015, the national 
parliament in Kiev amended the law on shareholder companies, which resulted in 
Kolomoyskiy’s loss of control over Ukrnafta.70 Kolomoiskiy remained a powerful shadow 
figure in local politics however competing against Ukraine’s other prominent oligarch Rinat 
Akhmetov whose interests in the region were represented by Alexandr Vilkul and his 
“Opposition Block.” Ukrainian observers characterized the local elections of the mayors of 
Dnipropetrovsk and the city of Krivoy Rog which featured politicians backed by competing 
oligarchic interests, as “dirty politics” and “dirty elections.”71  
Thus, well into the second decade of 2000s, we observe elements of regional oligarchic 
rule and political machines intricately linked to Soviet-era industrial networks; these have 






The Dnipropetrovsk case illustrates a pattern that we expect to find in Ukraine in general. 
Specifically, we expect communist/soviet legacies of industrial planning to have contributed to 
developmental outcomes like industrialization, urbanization and high human capital 
development. We expect these legacies to have a detrimental effect on democratic outcomes in 
post-communist states and regions. Thus, rather than “defying” conventional development 
predictions, the legacies of state-led socialist development are in our analysis seen as “culprits,” 
responsible for eroding the potential for development of genuine electoral competition. Our 
proposed causal mechanism links the legacy of mega-industries, managerial control over 
workforce and workforce dependencies to the emergence of powerful economic tycoons. These 
industry magnates influence electoral processes because they possess control over vulnerable 
and dependent workforce (see Figure 1). While in some settings like Russia, the electoral 
“pyramids” may be controlled by one group of nationally-prominent economic actors, in others, 
like Ukraine, multiple oligarchs mobilize regional electorates as part of competition over 
national and regional political power and economic resources. The empirical analysis that 
follows is guided by the following baseline hypothesis: 
 
Territories, which, due to Soviet industrial planning legacies, exhibit higher levels of 
urbanization and industrialization, should also exhibit lower levels of electoral quality in the 
post-communist period. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
 
Data and methodology 
General approach 
To test the baseline hypothesis, we begin by regressing the main dependent variable (a 
characteristic of electoral quality) on a proxy for Soviet developmental legacies; a proxy for 
cultural-linguistic features of territories (another source of political variation across Ukrainian 
regions that features in the literature on Ukrainian politics); and additional controls. Soviet 
developmental legacies are measured employing contemporary data capturing the general 
developmental characteristics of the spatial unit of analysis. Second, we replace this proxy with 
a set of historical variables from the Soviet period, which allow us to test the “temporal depth” 
of contemporary development outcomes, as well as proxies for concentration of Soviet 
industrial assets, which capture the industrial aspect of the Soviet developmental project more 
accurately. Third, in line with our hypothesized causal mechanism, whereby Soviet 
developmental legacies are associated with stronger oligarchic power, we introduce a further 
variable quantifying the presence of oligarchic groups in the region, a mediating factor between 
Soviet developmental legacies and electoral quality.  
The first step is implemented using rayon-level data.72 Ukraine is administratively 
divided into twenty-seven regions, including twenty-four oblasti; two special-status cities of 
Kyiv and Sevastopol; and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. These regions are in turn 
subdivided into roughly 500 lower-level units, the rayony (districts) and rayon-free cities. 
Unfortunately, Ukrainian statistical agencies do not publish other rayon-level data, which 
would be relevant for our analysis, namely Soviet-era characteristics of rayony and 
concentration of Soviet-era industrial assets. Data for these and several other indicators are 
available at the oblast level however. Similarly, the information on oligarchic groups is 
accessible only for the oblast level. The second and third steps of the analysis were therefore 
implemented using oblast-level data, in separate sections of the statistical analysis. Because of 
the small number of oblast-level observations, we limit our analysis to performing simple 
correlations. As an extension of our analysis, we estimate multi-level models, where oblast-
level data are added to rayon-level regressions.73  
 
Dependent variable 
To explore regional variations in electoral quality in Ukraine, we leverage the approach that 
Tatu Vanhanen developed as part of his cross-national analysis of democratic variations among 
nations.74 Vanhanen uses electoral data to investigate the competition and participation aspects 
of political systems. Because our empirical strategy is to leverage district (rayon)-level data, 
we are uncomfortable with the usage of the term “sub-national democracy.” Although some 
studies have made a case for considering sub-national regions as mini-polities in their own 
right,75 this characterization would be problematic for rural precinct- or urban-level units that 
constitute the core unit of analysis in this paper. Furthermore, Vanhanen admits that the label 
“democracy” may be problematic even as applied to national contexts, accepting that the index 
may cover “the variation in the degree of autocracy among non-democracies.”76 We opt instead 
for the term “electoral quality” (EQ) as a measure of the quality of the democratic process which 
is better suited to the sub-national contexts we are focusing on.77  
Although electoral statistics are but one indicator of electoral quality,78 they provide a 
straightforward measure absent more nuanced data on ballot-stuffing, vote-buying, 
intimidation, etc., that would be comparable across hundreds of precincts. The Vanhanen 
electoral index, which is composed of two sub-indictors, is meant to factor in both the 
competition and participation aspects of electoral processes. The participation sub-indicator is 
based on electoral turnout statistics. Clearly, high turnout is not in itself indicative of genuine 
participation and may in fact proxy for authoritarian forms of mass mobilization for sham 
elections practiced in communist contexts. Alone, this is meaningless as a measure of 
democracy. As Vanhanen notes, the Index of Democratization (ID) “gets high values only if 
the values of both basic indicators are high.  If either of them is zero, the value of ID will also 
drop to zero.”79 The competition sub-indicator is computed by taking the vote share obtained 
by all parties during elections except the party with the largest vote share; thus, the sub-indicator 
is one hundred minus the vote share obtained by the winning party. The final index is obtained 
by multiplying these two sub-indicators and dividing the result by one hundred. Empirical 
applications of the index have produced roughly similar assessments of cross-national and sub-
national variations in electoral processes to those relying on more complex measures,80 thereby 
providing some reassurance about the validity of this method for assessing sub-national 
variations in the quality of the electoral dimension of democratic representation and 
contestation. 
To construct the baseline sub-national EQ index, we utilize data from local elections 
held on 25 October 2015. In the 2015 elections, voters elected councilors to the regional 
assemblies (rada), to assemblies of districts and cities, and to lower-level settlement and village 
councils. The councils were elected using a proportional system.81 Using official electoral 
statistics obtained from the Ukrainian Central Electoral Commission, we computed EQ indices 
for oblasti and for individual rayony and rayon-free cities within oblasti. To our knowledge, 
our paper is the first to use district-level electoral data to explore the drivers of regional 
variations in the quality of electoral processes in Ukraine; this provides us with a major 
analytical leverage over research relying on oblast-level data. First, because of the large number 
of rayony, we can apply multivariate regression techniques to study the effects of Soviet 
planned economic development ceteris paribus other predictors of sub-national EQ. This 
strategy is useful for isolating the impact of Soviet policies of state-driven economic 
development from that of cultural variables. Second, there exists substantial within-oblast 
variation in EQ, which ought to be taken into account in research into Ukrainian politics. 82 The 
Supplementary Appendix (SA) SA1 reports oblast-level EQ indices; it also presents the 
distributional plots for EQ at the oblast and the rayon levels and maps of Ukraine showing 
variation in EQ across the country.  
 
Independent variables 
Our main proxy for Soviet developmental legacies at the rayon level is the share of urban 
population in the rayon according to the most recent (2001) census. We regress the EQ score 
computed at the rayon level on urbanization to test the conventional expectation of co-variance 
between this important indicator of development and voting patterns. Two other development 
proxies are employed. First, we create a dummy variable for rayon-free cities, which are usually 
relatively large urban centers and typically feature high concentrations of institutions of higher 
learning, services and industry.83 Second, the Ukrainian statistical agency reports data for 
average salaries at the rayon level for the year 2015 in Hryvnia. 
 We also include variables measuring cultural-linguistic variation and capturing the East-
West divide in Ukrainian politics. Specifically, we employ a measure of the share of those 
claiming Ukrainian to be their native language in the 2001 census. Language preferences and 
practices could reflect long-term historical processes related to nation-building and intensity of 
social ties to Russia. We also created two dummy variables to identify the rayony with a large 
proportion of non-Ukrainian-speakers.84 Both interval and the dummy measures of the cultural 
specificity are of course collinear and thus not included in the same regression; we test whether 
the results change if we substitute the former for the latter.85 Finally, we add two control 
variables: longitude and latitude of rayony, thereby accounting for geographical characteristics 
potentially impinging on development, while also capturing external influences associated with 
geographic proximity to the West. (The theoretical rationales for the inclusion of these variables 
are discussed in SA12).  
We augment these rayon-level variables with a set of oblast-level variables. In 
particular, the following variables and indicators are employed: (a) data capturing urbanization 
and higher education variations in the Ukrainian oblasti available from the 1979 Soviet census, 
the last census before the onset of Gorbachev’s far-reaching economic and political reforms, 
and one held at the height of the so-called Stagnation Era associated with the leadership of 
Leonid Brezhnev;86 (b) the share of members of the ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU) in proportion to regional populations in the mid-1970s;87 and (c) variables measuring 
the extent to which individual regions had been subjected to Stalin’s industrialization drive in 
the 1930s, specifically, industrial output and employment in large industries in 1933, that is, 
the period corresponding to the completion of the first five-year economic development plan.88 
Furthermore, we use oblast-level data to capture the extent of concentration of Soviet industrial 
assets. Our focus is on assets, which are likely to generate strong workforce dependencies, as 
indeed a form of institutional path-dependency in that old technological and production ties 
from the Soviet period often survived market reforms. Two major industries which were 
essential to the Soviet industrialization project—ferrous metals and machine-building—remain 
important in the Ukrainian economy. For each region, we compute the share of these two 
industries in total industrial output in 2015. 
 
Electoral quality and soviet developmental legacies 
 
We report the main results of statistical analysis in Table 1.89 In Models 1-3, we run simple 
regressions of rayon-level EQ scores on our key variables of interest, namely urbanization; 
share of Ukrainian-speakers; dummy variables for large non-Ukrainian-speaking minorities 
(and dropping the share of Ukrainian speakers, since it measures the same phenomenon); and 
dummy variable for rayon-free cities as another proxy for development. We find that at the 
rayon level, urbanization is associated with lower EQ, as is the status of rayon-free cities. These 
results hold ceteris paribus the cultural-linguistic variables. Thus, keeping cultural-linguistic 
variation in Ukraine constant, the legacies of Soviet economic development appear to have a 
negative effect on sub-national electoral quality. Simultaneously, we find that higher share of 
Ukrainian speakers increases the values of the EQ index. The presence of both Russian and 
non-Russian minorities has the effect of a reduction in the value of the EQ score, though the 
negative effect of the presence of sizeable Russian minorities is larger. In Model 4, we add the 
longitude and latitude indicators. Our results hold, while also confirming the East-West pattern 
in electoral variations (longitude) and the lower level of EQ in the Southern part of Ukraine 
(latitude). In the SA3, we demonstrate that using salaries as an alternative proxy for economic 
development likewise provides strong support for our baseline hypothesis. SA7 reports several 
robustness checks, confirming the main results. SA10 shows that the result holds not only in 
Ukraine as a whole, but also in each of the large macro-regions of the country (West, East, 
South and Center). 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
 Next, we augment our rayon-level analysis with tests that include oblast-level Soviet-
era developmental indicators. We also ascertain the links between concentration of Soviet-era 
industrial assets and EQ. In the main part of the paper, we present the correlation coefficients; 
the results of multi-level analysis are reported in SA4 and confirm our findings.90 In the Table 
2, we report correlation coefficients between the historical variables presented above and the 
oblast EQ index.91 As expected, all the correlation coefficients are significant and negative. 
Exceptions to this pattern are the values of industrial output and employment during the Soviet 
period of rapid industrialization. In this case, however, the sample is extremely small—merely 
six regions—which makes obtaining statistically significant results impossible. We replicate 
our results excluding the oblasti which had been under Austro-Hungarian rule before World 
War I; or had been under Polish, Romanian and Czechoslovak rule during the interwar period.92 
Excluding these regions does not change our results. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
 In the remaining part of our analysis, we test whether the concentration of Soviet 
industrial assets has significant and detrimental effects on regional and local EQ, and test 
whether we observe correlation of this indicator with the oblast-level EQ index. This correlation 
coefficient is negative (minus 0.529, significant at 1 percent level), implying that regions with 
a larger share of assets essential to the Soviet industrial development project, also feature lower 
values on the EQ index. This is in line with our baseline hypothesis. In SA8 we employ another 
proxy for persistence of Soviet industrial assets: the structure of international trade—and 
demonstrate that there is a negative (but insignificant) correlation between the persistence of 
post-Soviet trade ties and oblast-level EQ.93  
  
Presence of oligarchic groups 
 
Thus far, our analysis has demonstrated that the historical legacies of Soviet economic 
development have a negative effect on the quality of electoral processes in Ukrainian regions; 
and that this outcome is related to the prevalence of Soviet-era heavy industry. In line with our 
conceptual model (Figure 1), we expect this effect to be particularly strong because regions 
with high concentration of Soviet assets are also likely to attract oligarchic business groups, 
making them more powerful in the context of sub-national politics.  
We anticipate two possible outcomes related to the presence of regional oligarchic 
strongholds. The presence of several competing oligarchic groupings in a region could well 
generate competition for control over the electorate. As in Russia in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
rival business tycoons may support competing political parties, civil society groups and the 
media to garner electoral support for oligarch-friendly political candidates. As the case of 
Russia in the 1990s demonstrates, competition among political and economic elites may well 
have contributed to regional and national political pluralism.94 A second scenario is also 
plausible whereby any form of oligarchic capture of national, reginal and local politics—
including that involving competing economic groupings—is bound to be detrimental to 
democracy. Perception that politics are driven by oligarchs may well generate citizen apathy 
and cynicism about political participation under “crony capitalism.”95 This second potential 
scenario is in line with the causal mechanisms proposed in this paper. We investigate which of 
these effects dominates empirically.  
 To test whether oblasti with high levels of concentration of Soviet-era assets were 
comparatively more likely to became economic bases for powerful oligarchs, we construct an 
index of presence of nationally-prominent oligarchic groups in individual regions. We identify 
oligarchs using the Heiko Pleines dataset, one of the most comprehensive sources on oligarchic 
groups in post-communist Ukraine.96 The list includes the wealthy nationally-prominent and 
politically-influential tycoons. We focus our attention on oligarchs listed as remaining powerful 
under the Poroshenko presidency. Next, we scrutinize the websites of the holding groups 
controlled by these different oligarchs, for instance, SKM for Akhmetov, AVEK for Feldman, 
etc., and create a list of oblasti in which these oligarchs are economically active. Finally, we 
create an index measuring the total number of oligarchic groups present in an oblast. Detailed 
information on the presence of individual groups in the oblasti is reported in SA5. While we 
are aware of the limitations of the index in that only the most prominent business tycoons are 
included, to our knowledge, it represents the most systematic attempt to capture the regional 
dimension of oligarchic influence in Ukraine. We compute the index for all regions except Kyiv 
City, because the status of the national capital encourages most business groups to have at least 
a representative office there. The highest value of the index is obtained for Dnipropetrovsk, 
where nine out of the twelve nationally-prominent business groups are present, followed by 
Kharkiv. The smallest index is obtained for Chernivitsi, where only one of the groups operates. 
Higher values of the index are concentrated in the wealthier regions.  
 As expected, the oligarch index is positively correlated with most of our developmental 
indicators: 0.777 for income per capita; 0.811 for the share of population with university degree; 
0.580 for the share of college students; 0.711 for urbanization. All correlation coefficients are 
significant at the 1% confidence level. Importantly, the oligarch index is significantly and 
negatively correlated with our EQ index. The correlation coefficient is minus 0.428, significant 
at the 5 percent level. These results indicate that we observe the hypothesized scenario of 
oligarchs having a detrimental effect on Ukraine’s sub-national electoral quality and that this 
effect appears to override the potential contribution of competition of oligarchic groups to the 




Our paper systematically explored the implications of spatially-uneven Soviet-era state-led 
development for sub-national electoral quality in Ukraine. Following other scholars who have 
analysed the implications of Soviet industrialization legacies for democracy in post-communist 
contexts97 we have argued that the structural peculiarities of socialist state-led development 
provided economic actors who acquired control over key Soviet-era industrial assets in the 
context of post-Soviet privatization with opportunities to engage in the manipulation of the 
electorate. Our objective is not to challenge the premises of classic modernization theorizing 
suggesting a positive link between modernization and democratization.  Rather, it is to highlight 
how conventional proxies of modernization such as industrialization, urbanization and GDP per 
capita in post-communist contexts may capture the legacies of socialist planned industrial 
development. 
 Our analysis of district-level data indicates that industrialization, GDP per capita and 
urbanization negatively correlate with electoral quality in Ukraine’s regions. These indices of 
development also positively correlate with the presence of powerful oligarchs in regional 
economies. In line with theorizing into co-variance between cultural, ethno-linguistic and 
historical legacies of imperial tutelage and democracy in Ukraine, we find support for a broad 
East-West pattern of variations in electoral quality. Yet, even when we factor these variations 
into our analysis, we observe that communist-era development negatively correlates with 
regional electoral quality. This latter finding in turn supports arguments about the links between 
the structural underpinnings of economic development and democracy. As our illustrative case 
study of Dnipropetrovsk demonstrates, oligarchic power bases tend to be in regions that the 
USSR targeted for industrialization. Control over regional enterprises provided oligarchs with 
power over workforce, a significant share of which retained employment and other links to 
Soviet-era mega-industries. 
 Our sub-national research strategy helps illuminate the “poorly understood”98 causal 
mechanisms accounting for political outcomes in relatively developed “partial democracies” in 
large-n cross-national analyses. As such, our research contributes to the wider comparative 
debates about the links between economic development and democracy in a variety of 
geographic, historical and cultural contexts.  Our work broadly dovetails with arguments that 
economic development may not straightforwardly predict democracy or democratic 
resilience.99 Instead, we demonstrate how the structural aspects of development may interact 
with other political-institutional legacies peculiar to a given national and sub-national setting 




SA1: Electoral Quality (EQ) scores 
 
Region  Participation Competition EQ score Variation in EQ score 
Cherkasy Center 47.1 83.2 39.2 4.5 
Chernihiv Center 48.8 83.4 40.7 5.6 
Chernivtsi West 48.9 81.3 39.8 5.5 
Dnipropetrovsk East 43.0 67.6 29.1 4.1 
Ivano-Frankivsk West 52.9 78.9 41.7 5.8 
Kharkiv East 44.4 65.8 29.2 4.4 
Kherson South  37.4 78.8 29.5 5.3 
Khmelnitskii West 50.8 82.4 41.8 6.3 
Kirovograd Center 46.4 80.4 37.3 4.0 
Kyiv City Center 41.9 73.3 30.7 - 
Kyiv Oblast Center 49.8 78.3 39.0 4.3 
Lviv West 56.3 79.4 44.7 6.6 
Mykolaiv South 38.5 78.4 30.2 4.4 
Odessa South 41.9 79.2 33.2 4.9 
Poltava Center 49.0 84.6 41.5 5.0 
Rivne West 50.8 78.9 40.1 3.4 
Sumy Center 46.0 83.0 38.2 4.9 
Ternopil West 56.5 75.0 42.4 4.4 
Vinnytsia Center 50.2 72.1 36.2 4.0 
Volyn West 55.3 78.9 43.6 5.7 
Zakarpattia West 49.2 78.5 38.6 7.6 
Zaporizhia East 44.5 72.2 32.1 5.2 




Figure SA1.1: Map of oblast-level EQ scores 
Red: < 30; pink 30-35; yellow 35-40; green > 40: results for Kyiv City are not reported 
  





Figure SA1.3: Standard deviation of EQ score within oblasti 




   
Figure SA1.4: Distribution of EQ scores across rayony 
  
SA2: Elections that took place before 2015 
 
Employing data for the 2015 elections to construct EQ indices, we may be picking up time-
specific effects rather than those of persistent characteristics of regions. A number of factors, 
such as state reorganization after the 2013-2014 Revolution of Dignity (also known as 
Euromaidan), the war in the Donbass, severe economic crisis, the recent collapse of the Party 
of the Regions with its powerful political machine, to name just a few variables—could have 
potentially affected electoral behavior and thus the outcomes of our analysis. To ascertain 
whether the patterns uncovered for the 2015 elections are observed for previous electoral cycles 
as well, we compute the indicators of sub-national EQ using data for three previous electoral 
cycles. 
 
Specifically, we compare the 2015 results with those for the preceding regional elections of 
2010. The elections took place in all regions on October 31 except in Ternopil and Kyiv City 
where regional parliaments had been already elected in 2008-2009. The overall results for 
parties in the 2010 elections were strikingly different from those obtained by Ukraine’s leading 
parties in the 2015 elections. The 2010 elections represented a triumph of the Party of the 
Regions, the power base of the then-president Viktor Yanukovych. The Party of the Regions 
formed the largest faction in all the regional radas with the exception of the four oblasti of 
Zakarpattia, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Volyn. In 2015, the Party became essentially defunct, 
and its indirect successor, the Opposition Bloc, represented a weak force in the new national 
parliament. The overall political environment in Ukraine during both the regional elections—
in the aftermath of the accession of Yanukovych to the presidency and in the aftermath of the 
Revolution of Dignity—was also hardly comparable. Finally, the electoral systems were 
different across the two elections. While in 2015, the oblast radas were elected based on 
proportional representation, in 2010 a mixed system combining proportional representation and 
single-member districts was employed. Establishing broad similarities in political outcomes 
despite these variations in the political-institutional contexts in the two elections would provide 
confidence in the robustness of our findings. 
 
We also explore regional outcomes of two national parliamentary elections of 2006 and 2012. 
The 2006 elections took place two years after the Orange Revolution; the 2012 elections took 
place two years after Yanukovych became president. In the 2006 elections, a proportional 
representation system was employed, while in the 2012 elections a mixed system was 
employed. In our analysis, we only analyze the results of the electoral races in which the 
proportional representation system was applied. In both cases electoral behavior and outcomes 
do not measure the characteristics of regional politics per se. They are, however, interesting for 
us, if one accepts three—in the Ukrainian case highly plausible— assumptions. First, regional 
political machines may have been deployed in national-level elections. These machines tend to 
be affiliated with nation-level parties either directly—like the Party of the Regions, which 
controlled most of the eastern and southern oblasti in 2012—, or indirectly through informal 
alliances. Second, regional political machines use similar tactics to ensure success in regional 
and national elections, which may result in similar electoral outcomes. Third, voters behave 
differently during regional and national elections.  
 
Table SA2.1 reports the correlation coefficients between the scores for the Vanhanen indices 
computed for the 2006, 2010, 2012 and 2015 elections. For 2010, we compute two indicators: 
one looking only at the results of the proportional representation voting, and one taking single-
member districts into account (in the latter case we measure competition as 100 minus the share 
of the leading party in the regional rada). Figure SA2.1 presents the scatterplots of the 
Vanhanen indices for individual elections. The results indicate that spatial patterns of 
participation and competition were similar across the 2010 and 2015 electoral cycles. Spatial 
patterns of participation and competition in parliamentary elections are also similar, although 
the correlation is lower, which reflects variations between national and regional politics. Table 
SA2.2 computes the correlation coefficients between the Vanhanen indicators for various years. 
We observe persistence in spatial patterns of participation and competitiveness in Ukrainian 
regions.  
 
As a final check, we also calculated an average score of EQ in Ukrainian regions, using the 
2006, 2010 (without single-member districts), 2012 and 2015 data. As Table SA2.2 shows, the 
results that we obtained are essentially the same as for individual indices.   
 
Table SA2.1: Correlation between the Vanhanen indices for the 2015 elections and Vanhanen indices for 
elections that took place in other years 
Elections Correlation 
coefficient 
Regional elections 2010, excluding single-member districts 0.806*** 
Regional elections 2010, including single-member districts 0.816*** 
Rada elections, 2006 0.722*** 
Rada elections, 2012 0.654*** 
 
Note: the indicators were computed using the following data. For the Rada elections, we used the data compiled 
by Rivera (2014). For the 2010 regional elections, competition was measured using the Wikipedia data (Ukrainian 
version); participation was measured using the data published by Kommentarii.ua 
(http://comments.ua/politics/208209-YAvka-mestnih-viborah-stala.html), except for Khmelnytskyi oblast; for this 
oblast, we measure turnout data available from UNIAN, 2010, 1 November, 12:36). *** significant at the 1% 
level, ** 5%, * 10% 
 



























Urbanization -0.743*** -0.716*** -0.538*** -0.164 -0.717*** 
College education -0.750*** -0.678*** -0.492** -0.075 -0.747*** 
Pre-Communist literacy -0.336 -0.461* -0.496* -0.211 -0.586** 
CPSU membership share -0.753*** -0-840*** -0.396* -0.129 -0.623*** 
Education, Stagnation era (1979) -0.635*** -0.574*** -0.369* 0.008 -0.743*** 
Urbanization, Stagnation era 
(1979) 
-0.821*** -0.747*** -0.592*** -0.247 -0.822*** 
Share of Ukrainian speakers 0.770*** 0.744*** 0.794*** 0.749*** -0.877*** 
Distance from Brussels -0.846*** -0.876*** -0.623*** -0.561*** -0.791*** 
Note: Urbanization from the Census data of 2001 is used. *** significant at 1% level, ** 5%, * 10% 
  
   
  
 
Figure SA2.1: Correlation of the 2005 EQ scores and EQ scores from previous elections 
 
  
SA3: Average salaries as proxies for development 
 
In addition to urbanization, which serves as the main proxy for development at the district level 
in our analysis, we also extracted data on average per capita salaries in each district. Income 
could be regarded as one proxy for development, but the particular measure we use has a 
number of disadvantages. It may not capture various forms of entrepreneurial and self-
employment revenues, which may shape electoral behavior in a region. Furthermore, the quality 
of reporting of income is relatively low due to widespread tax evasion. We therefore use this 
measure as supplementary to the main urbanization proxy of development patterns in Ukraine’s 
districts. 
 
In the Table SA3.1 we report our findings for this variable. In this case, the outcomes of 
estimations are somewhat more heterogeneous than in the case of urbanization. If we use the 
full sample of rayony and estimate OLS regressions controlling for the share of Ukrainian 
speaking population, the effect of salaries is insignificant. If we, however, control for oblast-
specific fixed effects, the effect becomes significant and negative, in line with our main 
hypothesis. Thus, districts, where higher salaries are paid, are characterized by lower level of 
EQ, once one controls for oblast-specific factors (which could, for example, be driven by 
differences in performance of tax authorities monitoring whether companies pay salaries in a 
legal way or informally). Furthermore, the distribution of Ukrainian rayony according to 
salaries is characterized by presence of relatively few outliers with extremely high salaries 
(these outliers do not necessarily include oblast-level capitals and large cities; in many cases, 
these are smaller cities dominated by one particularly successful enterprise). In a further 
specification, we run our regressions excluding the outliers (all rayony with salaries exceeding 
4,000 Hryvnia, see Figure SA3.1). In this case, again we find significant and negative effect of 
salaries on sub-national EQ, which corresponds to our hypothesis. Finally, if we control 
simultaneously for per capita salaries and urbanization, the latter keeps its significant and 
negative effect on EQ. 
 
In sum, we confirm hypothesis H1 if we use salaries per capita as a proxy for income per capita 
(and hence, for development) and exclude the outlier rayony with extremely high income or 
control for oblast-specific factors. The results for urbanization are unaffected by inclusion of 
salary per capita in the set of covariates. 
 












Salaries per capita -0.000 0.000 -0.003*** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Share of Ukrainian speakers 0.179*** 0.151*** 0.182*** 0.160*** 0.078*** 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017) 
Urbanization  -0.059***  -0.053***  
  (0.009)  (0.010)  
Constant 23.032*** 25.963*** 29.713*** 29.778*** 34.385*** 
 (2.226) (1.999) (2.826) (2.628) (2.318) 
Observations 558 555 497 494 558 
R-squared 0.221 0.280 0.239 0.282 0.524 












Note: *** significant at 1% level; ** 5%; * 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Note that the distribution of urbanization does not suffer from the problem of outliers to the 
same extent as the distribution of salaries per capita. Figure SA3.2 shows that it is bimodal: 
with a group of rural districts with smaller cities (average urbanization close to 30%) and a 
group of larger cities (100% urbanization). If we regress the EQ index on urbanization and share 
of Ukrainian speakers only for districts with urbanization below 60% (that is, roughly excluding 
the second peak of the distribution), our results are confirmed. 
 
 
Figure SA3.1: Distribution of districts according to salaries per capita in 2015 (in hryvna) 
 
 
Figure SA3.2: Distribution of districts according to urbanization 
SA4: Combining oblast- and district-specific variables 
 
In this Appendix, we estimate regressions combining oblast- and district-level variables. For 
this purpose, we use the dataset of Ukrainian districts and regress district-level EQ on oblast- 
and district-level covariates. In Table SA4.1, we employ three historical oblast-level covariates:  
pre-Communist literacy, “stagnation era” education (using data from the 1979 census) and 
CPSU saturation—that is, the proportion of citizens with communist party membership. We are 
thereby able to assess the impact of various historical development indicators controlling for 
contemporary urbanization and ethnolinguistic composition of the population.  
 
Considering that these variables are available only at the oblast level, we employed several 
strategies to deal with potential downward bias of standard errors. Specifically, we ran 
regressions clustering standard errors at the oblast level; a hierarchical random-effect model 
with a random oblast-level intercept; and a hierarchical random-effect model with a random 
intercept and a random slope of oblast-level covariates.  
 
We find that the CPSU saturation variable and the variable of education level in the Brezhnev-
era “stagnation” period have the effect of dampening sub-national EQ in Ukraine. We also find 
that the effect of pre-Communist literacy is weaker than that of the CPSU saturation variable 
and appears as insignificant in several models. Table SA4.2 looks at the share of heavy industry 
(as a proxy for asset specificity). The variable has a significant and negative effect throughout 
all specifications.  
  


























Urbanization -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.059*** -0.059*** -0.067*** -0.067*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Share of Ukrainian-speakers 0.039** 0.039* 0.032** 0.033** 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.098*** 0.098** 0.038*** 0.038*** 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.043) (0.014) (0.014) 
Stagnation era education 
(1979)         -1.250*** -1.250** -1.556*** -1.763*** 
         (0.153) (0.498) (0.506) (0.615) 
CPSU membership -3.720*** -3.720*** -3.771*** -3.684*** -2.305*** -2.305*** -2.335*** -2.335***     
 (0.401) (0.898) (0.969) (0.938) (0.257) (0.701) (0.626) (0.626)     
Pre-Communist literacy -0.096*** -0.096 -0.113** -0.111*         
 (0.024) (0.067) (0.057) (0.059)         
Constant 57.620*** 57.620*** 58.780*** 58.209*** 42.319*** 42.319*** 48.161*** 48.162*** 38.385*** 38.385*** 45.604*** 46.659*** 
 (3.258) (5.124) (5.731) (5.526) (2.336) (4.692) (3.467) (3.467) (2.245) (5.894) (3.284) (3.493) 
Observations 394 394 394 394 555 555 555 555 555 555 555 555 
R-squared 0.407 0.407   0.396 0.396   0.352 0.352   
Random-effect parameters             
SD (Constant, oblast level)   1.870 0.000   3.214 3.214   3.465  
SD (CPSU membership)    0.329    0.000    0.000 
SD (Pre-Communist literacy)    0.020         
SD (Stagnation era 
education)            0.601 
SD (Residual)   4.223 4.223   4.414 4.414   4.413 4.412 
Clustered standard errors  Yes    Yes    Yes   
Note: *** significant at 1% level; ** 5%; * 10%. Standard errors in parentheses; for OLS estimators, robust standard errors are applied 
  










Urbanization -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.067*** -0.067*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Share of Ukrainian-speakers 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 
 (0.016) (0.027) (0.014) (0.014) 
Share of heavy industry -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.165*** -0.165*** 
 (0.017) (0.029) (0.060) (0.060) 
Constant 32.120*** 32.120*** 40.059*** 40.059*** 
 (1.660) (2.458) (1.982) (1.982) 
Observations 555 555 555 555 
R-squared 0.34 0.34   
Random-effect parameters     
SD (Constant, oblast level)   3.577 3.577 
SD (Share of heavy industry)    0.000 
SD (Residual)   4.413 4.413 
Clustered standard errors  Yes   
 
Note: *** significant at 1% level; ** 5%; * 10%. Standard errors in parentheses; for OLS estimators, robust standard errors are applied




The definition of oligarchs that we (following Pleines 2016) adopt in this paper is restrictive in 
two important ways: 
 
- First, it sets a very high threshold for being included in the set of oligarchs: only selected 
few businessmen with strong political influence (and not merely businessmen with large 
assets) are treated as belonging to this group. Since we are interested in the political 
influence of business tycoons, this approach seems to be reasonable. In fact, Aslund (2005) 
distinguishes between the political interests of the highest echelon of business tycoons with 
strong links to politicians and those of other wealthy businessmen who may be more 
interested in the establishment of transparent rules of the game and open competition.  
 
- Second, the list excludes numerous local business groups, which fail to exercise influence 
at the national level, but impinge on political life in individual oblasti or even cities. Conceptually, 
our results are not solely driven by the presence of strong national oligarchic groups in an 
oblast. In fact, if we were to focus on national oligarchic groupings, we would fail to account 
for the negative effects of economic development indices in Western Ukraine, where few 
nationally-prominent oligarchic groups operate. The lesser local oligarchs play a non-
negligible role in local economies and politics, also affecting sub-national elections 
(Stratievski 2015). Unfortunately, no systematic data on these oligarchs exist. Thus, our 
proxy probably captures only the cases of the most pronounced oligarchic influence of the 
national groups with substantial resources.  
 
In addition, we accept that we may miss some assets not listed on those websites, as well as 
assets with non-transparent ownership structure. Some of the oligarchic business groups do not 
provide any information on the scope of their operations, in which case we rely on print media 
and online news sources to obtain additional information. Still, the cases of the most significant 
oligarchic presence are likely to be captured by our data. 
 
Empirical results: 
Oligarch Group Source Oblast 
Rinat Akhmetov SCM Group website Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Lviv, Odessa, Zaporizhia 
Volodymyr Boiko Metinvest Group website Dnipropetrovsk 
Oleksandr Feldman AVEC Group website Kharkiv 
Dimitro Firtsah Group DF Group website All oblast except Kherson, Zakarpattia, Ivano-
Frankivsk and Chernivitsi 
Ihor Kolomoiskyi Privat Internet; website of 
Ukrnafta  
Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, 
Odessa, Poltava, Sumy, Zaporizhia 
Yuri Kosyuk MPKh Group website Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kherson, 
Sumy, Vinnytsia 
Vadim Novinskii Smart 
Holding 
Group website All oblast except Chernivitski, Sumy, Volyn and 
Zhitomyr  
Viktor Pinchuk Interpipe / 
East One 
Group website Dnipropetrovsk 
Anton Prigodskii - Internet Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv 
Serhii Tigipko TAS Group website Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava 
Konstantin Zhevago Finansy i 
Kredit 
Internet Kharkiv, Kyiv Oblast, Lviv, Odessa, Poltava, 
Zakarpattia, Zhitomyr 
Note: Luhansk and Donetsk are not included. Vasil Khmelnitskyi is excluded, since his assets are mostly located 
in Kyiv. 
SA6: Summary statistics 
 No. obs. Mean St. dev. Min Max 
Oblast-level      
CPSU membership share 23 4.91 1.42 1.36 8.73 
Distance from Brussels 23 2131.35 325.86 1631.00 2630.00 
Education (contemporary) 23 29.28 5.53 21.30 47.70 
Education (1979) 23 5.96 3.29 3.90 19.30 
Income 23 25867.19 9443.35 17789.70 65672.80 
Pre-Communist literacy 15 27.02 12.55 14.70 55.38 
Share of college students (per 10,000 
inhabitants) 23 
3.82 2.56 1.77 14.22 
Share of exports to Russia 23 26.52 11.16 9.39 51.82 
Share of ferrous metals and machine 
building in the industrial output 23 
17.13 13.40 3.47 51.27 
Share of Ukrainian speakers 23 82.31 16.06 46.28 98.34 
Urbanization (contemporary) 23 61.10 14.65 37.15 100.00 
Urbanization (1959) 23 35.57 20.19 17.00 100.00 
Urbanization (1970) 23 44.48 18.86 23.00 100.00 
Urbanization (1979) 23 51.35 17.12 31.00 100.00 
Rayon-level      
Salary per capita 568 3223.88 834.08 2185.00 8757.00 
Non-Russian minority 558 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
Rayon-free city 568 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Russian minority 558 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Share of Ukrainian speakers 558 88.03 17.53 4.80 99.80 
Urbanization 555 43.25 31.25 0.00 100.00 
 
  




We check whether our results are driven by a small number of outlier observations using the 
following approaches, which all confirm our results: 
 
- We exclude all districts with more than 1,000,000 population and with more than 500,000 
population – these large metropolitan centers could have different political dynamics 
compared to the rest of the country. 
 
- We exclude rayon-free cities, which either have no rural population or where de-jure rural 
population has de-facto a strikingly different status and composition than in the actual rural 
areas. 
 
- We run robust regressions (rreg routine in Stata), which are less affected by outliers. 
 
- We run median regressions with bootstrapped standard errors, including 1000 bootstraps, 
which again are less affected by outliers than OLS. 
 
Oblast-level effects and clustered standard errors 
 
We are also aware of another issue of potential correlation between politics in individual rayony 
of a single oblast. The governments at the oblast-level have administrative control over rayon-
level administrations. Furthermore, the rayony of a single oblast are likely to share multiple 
common characteristics. We therefore re-estimate all the results  
 
- using standard errors clustered at the oblast level, as well as  
 
- oblast fixed effects. 
 
Our main result survives both of these adjustments.  
 
Nonparametric analysis of spatial effects  
 
In addition to the baseline specifications reported in the paper, we also run a multivariate non-
parametric regression spline model, as suggested by McMillen (2012). It has the advantage of 
capturing the spatial specificity of the territory more accurately. We regress the EQ scores on 
various splines of urbanization, share of Ukrainian-speakers and geographical coordinates 
determined as part of the estimation (mvrs routine in Stata developed by Patrick Royston). The 
results for urbanization are fully confirmed. For the share of Ukrainian-speakers we observe a 
non-linear effect, which most likely reflects the fact that the share of Ukrainian-speakers affects 
sub-national EQ differently in the different regions of Ukraine. 
 
 
Dominant party effects 
 
Since one of the components of EQ is turnout, one could hypothetically envision the following 
mechanism affecting it. In certain parts of Ukraine, particular parties have stronger roots and 
dominate electoral campaigns. Some of these parties have more salient political agenda and, as 
a result, are able to attract higher turnout. Other parties have less salient agenda, leading to 
lower turnout. To check whether this mechanism could affect our results, we replicate the 
regressions controlling for 43 dummies for the parties winning the majority share in the rada 
in the particular district (if several parties had an equally large share, the values of the dummies 
for all of these parties for this district were set to one). We are aware that in this case reverse 
causality is possible (EQ could affect the electoral chances of particular parties), and hence use 
this test only as a robustness check. Our results do not change. 
  
SA8: Trade with Russia 
 
We employ an alternative indicator of importance of old industries crucial for the Soviet 
development project, the share of oblast exports to Russia. Exports to Russia could be driven 
by the competitiveness of Ukrainian industrial equipment on this market, which had been in 
turn shaped by Soviet-era technological ties. Furthermore, Lankina et al. (2016b) show that in 
Russia’s sub-national regions, higher volumes of trade with post-Soviet states are associated 
with lower democracy levels. This indicator, however, is noisier than that of the share of 
industrial output, because it can also be affected by mere proximity to Russia. (Ukraine does 
not report the industrial structure of regional trade with Russia). In addition, some Soviet-era 
industries are currently primarily oriented towards the European market. This is true for ferrous 
metals, which became one of the major sources of wealth for some of the largest Ukrainian 
oligarchic groups. We employ data on share of exports to Russia in 2013, before the start of the 
war in the Donbass, which disrupted trade ties. The correlation between the EQ score and share 
of exports to Russia is, as expected, negative (minus 0.200), but insignificant. 
 
  
SA9: Pre-communist legacies 
 
In addition to the analysis of the impact of communist-era development indicators, we also 
added a measure of pre-communist development, namely literacy rates in Ukrainian regions in 
the late 19th century. Some scholars have employed pre-communist literacy statistics to link 
patterns of pre-Communist schooling to levels of demand for democracy and resistance to 
Communist indoctrination (Darden et al. 2006; Peisakhin 2015). In turn, Lankina (2012) 
demonstrates that Russia’s regions with higher literacy levels in the 1890s also exhibited higher 
levels of democracy in the 1990s. The values of this indicator varied significantly among 
territories comprising present-day Ukraine, with literacy levels ranging from below 20 percent 
to over 50 percent of the population. 
 
Combining Austria-Hungarian and Russian Imperial data on literacy in the same dataset is 
problematic because of variations in definitions of literacy in the respective censuses. We 
therefore employ data from Russia’s First Imperial Census of 1897 which capture literacy 
variations in territories formerly under the tutelage of the Russian Empire. (The dataset does 
not include information for three oblasti: Zhytomyr, Rivne and Volyn. In a robustness check, 
we add data from Kessler and Markevich to capture literacy levels in these regions. This source 
includes only data at the level of the Russian Imperial gubernii. In the late 19th century these 
oblasti mostly belonged to the Volyn guberniya. We therefore assumed the same share of 
literates as for the overall Gubernya for each oblast. The results do not change.) 
 
The literacy indicator is significantly and negatively correlated with EQ (correlation coefficient 
of minus 0.516 for the sample of 15 regions, significant at 5 percent level). Here, we may be 
observing the “appropriation and subversion” mechanism at work, proposed by Lankina et al. 
(2016a) for Russia. The CPSU may have focused its developmental drive in regions where 
foundations for industrialization had been already laid before the Bolsheviks came to power. 
The soviet state effectively co-opted the better-educated strata of the ancien régime; subsequent 
generations also benefitted from better educational and other modern infrastructure which the 
Bolsheviks expanded in areas where the relevant foundations had been already laid before the 
Revolution. In turn, these processes arguably reduced the potential of the soviet intelligentsia 
to serve as a constituency for democratic support after the collapse of communism.  
 
Consistent with these causal mechanisms, we observe positive correlation between pre-
communist literacy and CPSU saturation in the regions (coefficient of 0.598, significant at the 
5 percent level); this is similar to the results that Lankina et al. (2016a) report for Russia’s 
regions. Considering that we only employ data for regions of Eastern Ukraine formerly under 
Russian Tsarist tutelage, we discount the possible effects of the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s 
schooling legacies. According to an influential account, these legacies arguably facilitated the 
germination of nationalist—and, ultimately, anti-communist—sentiment among minority 





SA10: Results across Ukrainian macro-regions 
 
Are there differences between different parts of Ukraine in terms of the link between urbanization and EQ? To test this, we follow other scholars in 
distinguishing between four sets of regions: those in the East, the South, Center and the West (see SA1). We then replicate our regressions adding 
dummy variables for Eastern, Southern and Western regions, and interact the key covariates. We also run regressions separately for each set of regions. 
The results are reported in the Table below. Urbanization has a negative effect on EQ throughout the country, including in Western Ukraine; there is 
also no evidence that in the Eastern or Southern oblasti the negative effects of urbanization are stronger. These results support the logic underlying 
our main hypothesis H1. We also find that the positive correlation between the predominance of Ukrainian language speakers and the values on the 
EQ index only holds for Western oblasti. Similarly, we find that only in the West, the presence of large non-Russian minorities appears to have a 
negative effect on EQ. These outcomes suggest that in our analysis of the drivers of regional EQ variations, ethno-linguistic variables could not be 
straightforwardly divorced from the wider regional structural and economic factors. 
 
 
Table SA10.1: Determinants of EQ, rayon-level, variation across groups of regions, OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Urbanization -0.060*** -0.063*** -0.064*** -0.068*** -0.045** -0.063*** -0.082*** -0.037** -0.048** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.014) (0.018) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019) 
Share of Ukrainian speakers 0.057*** 0.062*** 0.021 0.158*** 0.033 0.031    
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.033) (0.040) (0.030) (0.022)    
Large Russian-speaking minority       2.292 -2.717*** -3.634*** 
       (2.906) (0.888) (0.909) 
Large non-Russian speaking minority       -10.986***  1.370 
       (1.267)  (1.129) 
Eastern Ukraine -6.222*** -7.493*** -6.549*       
 (0.552) (0.934) (3.641)       
Western Ukraine 3.368*** 3.703*** -9.594**       
 (0.561) (0.909) (4.878)       
Southern Ukraine -5.004*** -5.242*** -6.367*       
 (0.620) (0.989) (3.607)       
Urbanization x Eastern Ukraine  0.027        
  (0.018)        
Urbanization x Western Ukraine  -0.009        
  (0.017)        
Urbanization x Southern Ukraine  0.008        
  (0.021)        
Share of Ukrainian speakers x Eastern 
Ukraine   -0.003       
   (0.041)       
Share of Ukrainian speakers x Western 
Ukraine   0.138***       
   (0.051)       
Share of Ukrainian speakers x Southern 
Ukraine   0.010       
   (0.040)       
Constant 35.914*** 35.465*** 39.349*** 29.979*** 30.720*** 32.920*** 46.149*** 34.455*** 36.396*** 
 (1.671) (1.719) (3.226) (4.009) (2.973) (1.822) (0.751) (0.778) (0.863) 
Observations 555 555 555 160 94 78 160 94 78 
R-squared 0.496 0.499 0.511 0.223 0.168 0.224 0.300 0.217 0.319 
Only Western Ukraine    Yes   Yes   
Only Eastern Ukraine     Yes   Yes  
Only Southern Ukraine      Yes   Yes 
Note: see Table 1.
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SA11: Development indicators at the oblast level 
Consistent with our rayon-level analysis, we employ (1) the developmental indicator of share 
of urban population in 2014; (2) the measure of disposable income per capita (in Hryvnia) in 
2014; and (3) regional data on educational attainment, which could be regarded as one proxy 
for economic development, likewise not available for the rayon level. Because in Ukraine, 
secondary schooling is mandatory and universal, we also employ two sets of higher education 
data: the share of oblast population with university degree, or, alternatively, of a record of 
several years of university attendance available from the last Ukrainian census held in 2001; 
and the share of students attending higher education institutions in the regional population in 
2014-2015. Furthermore, we add two proxies of cultural and geographic variation across 
Ukrainian regions, namely share of Ukrainian speakers and driving distance between the capital 
of an oblast and Brussels, the administrative capital of the European Union. The use of the 
second variable is motivated by earlier literature showing that geographic proximity to the EU 
may have an impact on subnational political development. Lankina and Getachew (2006), in 
their analysis of Russian regions, in particular, show that regions located closer to the EU as 
measured by proximity to Helsinki, experience stronger democratizing external influences of 
the European Union. Distance between the regional capital and Brussels does capture proximity 
to the EU (some scholars have employed another EU capital like Vienna, but using a different 
capital is merely a matter of recalculation of geographic distance and does not change the 
results).  
As the table below shows, we find that higher levels of EQ are associated with lower levels of 
sub-national economic development. If we drop Kyiv, our results do not change. The signs of 
the cultural and geographic variables are also in line with the analysis reported in the main part 
of the paper.  
 
Table SA12.1: Correlation between the oblast-level development indicators and the oblast-level 
EQ 
Indicator EQ, oblast score Participation, 
oblast score 
Competition, 


























































     
























Note: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5%, * 10%. Each cell also contains information on the number of observations 




SA12: Latitude and longitude 
 
The main specifications of the statistical regressions estimated in this study control for the 
latitude and longitude variables for the following reasons. As Ekiert and Hanson (2003, p. 32) 
write, “geography can be understood as a set of underlying natural or structural factors, 
including climate, topography, resource endowment, population density, migration patterns, 
patterns of trade and spatial patterns of production, and distance from economic centers.” These 
factors, in turn, may influence the developmental prospects of post-communist societies in 
greater or lower proximity to more development western economies; climate may also affect 
the costs of production (p. 33). Second, social space may be regarded as a “politically 
constructed phenomenon” rooted in historical relations of power, cultural and other networks.”  
Finally, space could be construed as “the combination of networks that often ignore natural and 
constructed regional boundaries” (p. 37)—concepts that focus on diffusion, spillover effects 
and neighbor emulation (p. 38). 
 
The specific measure of longitude allows us to control for proximity to the EU and, conversely, 
distance from Russia. In our analysis the measure also captures the historical and cultural 
differences between the East and the West of Ukraine: some territories have a history of Austro-
Hungarian or Polish tutelage, while others have been ruled by the Russian Empire (see 
Peisakhin 2015). Regional variations in Ukraine are not only pronounced along the East-West 
axis, but also along the North-South axis, with the Southern regions (Odessa or Kherson) due 
to their historical path from the late 18th century developing a weaker Ukrainian national 
identity (Solchanyk 1994). Our latitude measure captures these variations. The inclusion of two 
linear terms capturing the North-South and the East-West divide is an imperfect proxy for 
geographic characteristics of specific territories. We therefore also estimate semi-parametric 
regressions. This strategy allows us to control for geographic location in a more precise way. 
For example, we could better capture the effects of proximity to other urban centers, or for other 
specific features of a rayon conditioned by geographic location, which could matter for political 
outcomes. 
 





















Aslund, Anders (2005) Comparative Oligarchy: Russia, Ukraine and the United States. CASE Studies and 
Analyses No. 296. 
Darden, Keith, and Anna Grzymala-Busse (2006) “The Great Divide: Literacy, Nationalism, and the Communist 
Collapse.” World Politics 59:83-115. 
Ekiert, Grzegorz, and Stephen E. Hanson (2003) “Time, Space, and Institutional Change in Central and eastern 
Europe.” In Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe: Assessing the Legacy of Communist Rule, 
ed. G. Ekiert and S. E. Hanson. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Lankina, Tomila (2012) “Unbroken Links? From Imperial Human Capital to Post-Communist 
Modernisation.” Europe-Asia Studies 64 (4): 623-643. 
Lankina, Tomila V., Alexander Libman and Anastassia Obydenkova (2016a) “Appropriation and Subversion: Pre-
Communist Literacy, Communist Party Saturation, and Post-Communist Democratic Outcomes.” World Politics 
68 (2), 229-74. 
Lankina, Tomila V., Alexander Libman and Anastassia Obydenkova (2016b) “Authoritarian and Democratic 
Diffusion in Postcommunist Regions.” Comparative Political Studies 49 (12): 1599-629. 
Lankina, Tomila V., and Lullit Getachew (2006) “A Geographic Incremental Theory of Democratization: 
Territory, Aid, and Democracy in Post-Communist Regions.” World Politics 58 (4):536-82. 
Lankina, Tomila, Alexander Libman, et al. 2016. “Authoritarian and Democratic Diffusion in Post-Communist 
Regions.” Comparative Political Studies 49 (12): 1599-1629. 
McMillen, Daniel P. (2012) “Perspectives on Spatial Econometrics: Linear Smoothing with Structured Models.” 
Journal of Regional Science 52 (2): 192-209. 
Peisakhin, Leonid (2015) “Cultural Legacies: Persistence and Transmission.” In The Political Economy of 
Governance, ed. N. Schofield and G. Caballero. Heidelberg: Springer. 
Pleines, Heiko (2016) “Dataset on Ukrainian Oligarchs 2000-2015.” https://www.forschungsstelle.uni-
bremen.de/UserFiles/file/table-oligarchs-overview.xls (accessed 20 June 2018). 
Solchanyk, Roman (1994) “The Politics of State-Building: Center-Periphery Relations in the Post-Soviet 
Ukraine.” Europe-Asia Studies 46 (1):47-68. 
Stratievski, Dmitri (2015) “Die ukrainische Regierung auf dem Prüfstand: Die Regional- und Kommunalwahlen 





1 We are grateful to the anonymous reviewers and to editors for their very helpful and valuable 
suggestions for improvement of the paper. We also thank Elena Samarsky for her help with 
assembling electoral data for Ukraine. The British Academy generously funded part of the 
research conducted for this study. The project was furthermore funded within the framework of 
the Basic Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics 
(HSE) and by the Russian Academic Excellence Project '5-100'. All errors are of course solely 
our own. 
2 Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe: 
The Free Press, 1958); Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: 
Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53 
(March 1959), 69-105. 
3 Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, 
Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Adam Przeworski, Michael A. Alvarez, Jose 
Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, “What Makes Democracies Endure?,” in Larry 
Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., The Global Divergence of Democracies (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2001), 167-84; Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, “Endogenous 
Democratization,” Word Politics 55 (July 2003), 517-49. 
4 Przeworski et al., 2000; Przeworski et al., 2001. 
5 David L. Epstein, Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen and Sharyn O’Halloran, 
“Democratic Transitions,” American Journal of Political Science 50 (July 2006), 551-69. 
6 Lipset. 
7 Przeworski et al., 2000. 
8 Timothy Snyder and Milada Vachudova, “Are Transitions Transitory? Two Models of 
Political Change in Eastern Europe Since 1989,” East European Politics and Societies 11 
(Winter 1997), 1-35; David Collier and Steven Levitsky, “Democracy with Adjectives: 
Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research,” Word Politics 49 (April 1997), 430-51; 
Valerie Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist 
Countries (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
9 Ken Jowitt, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1992); Stephen E. Hanson, “The Leninist Legacy and Institutional Change,” 
Comparative Political Studies 28 (July 1995), 306-14; Stephen Kotkin and Mark R. Beissinger, 
“The Historical Legacies of Communism: An Empirical Agenda,” in Stephen Kotkin and Mark 
R. Beissinger, eds., Historical Legacies of Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Grigore Pop-Eleches and Joshua A. Tucker, 
Communism's Shadow: Historical Legacies and Contemporary Political Attitudes (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017); Timothy Frye, Ora John Reuter, and David Szakonyi, 
“Political Machines at Work Voter Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in the Workplace,” 
World Politics 66 (April 2014), 195-228; Henry E. Hale, Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime 
Dynamics in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Kelly 
McMann, Economic Autonomy and Democracy: Hybrid Regimes in Russia and Kyrgyzstan 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Tomila Lankina, Alexander Libman and 
Anastassia Obydenkova, “Appropriation and Subversion: Pre-Communist Literacy, 
Communist Party Saturation, and Post-Communist Democratic Outcomes,” World Politics 68 
(April 2016), 229-74. 
10 Susan Stewart, Regionen und Oligarchen: Einflüsse auf die ukrainische Außenpolitik 
(Berlin: SWP, 2011); Taras Kuzio, “Rise and Fall of the Party of Regions Political Machine,” 
Problems of Post-Communism 62 (May 2015), 174-86; Rosaria Puglisi, “The Rise of the 
                                                          
49 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Ukrainian Oligarchs,” Democratization 10 (2003), 99-123; Barbara Junisbai, “Improbable but 
Potentially Pivotal Oppositions: Privatization, Capitalists, and Political Contestation in the 
Post-Soviet Autocracies,” Perspectives on Politics 10 (December 2012), 891-916; Stanislav 
Markus and Volha Charnysh, “The Flexible Few: Oligarchs and Wealth Defense in Developing 
Democracies,” Comparative Political Studies 50 (January 2017), 1632-65. 
11 Sarah Birch, “Interpreting the Regional Effect in Ukrainian Politics,” Europe-Asia Studies 
52 (2000), 1017-41; Ralphs Clem, and Peter Craumer, “Shades of Orange: The Electoral 
Geography of Ukraine's 2004 Presidential Elections,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 46 
(2005), 364-85; Henry E. Hale, Nadiya Kravets, and Olga Onuch, “Can Federalism Unite 
Ukraine in a Peace Deal?,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, 2015; Elise Giuliano, “The Social 
Bases of Support for Self-determination in East Ukraine,” Ethnopolitics 14 (August 2015), 513-
22; Lucan A. Way, “National Identity and Authoritarianism: Belarus and Ukraine Compared,” 
in Paul D’Anieri, ed., Orange Revolution and Aftermath: Mobilization, Apathy, and the State 
in Ukraine (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2010), 129-59; Henry E. Hale and 
Robert W. Orttung, eds., Beyond the Euromaidan: Comparative Perspectives on Advancing 
Reform in Ukraine (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016); Gwendolyn Sasse, “The 'New' 
Ukraine: A State of Regions,” Regional and Federal Studies 11 (2001), 69-100; Taras Kuzio, 
“Competing Nationalisms, Euromaidan, and the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict,” Studies in 
Ethnicity and Nationalism 15 (April 2015), 157-69; Andrew Wilson, Ukraine Crisis: What it 
Means for the West (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014); Samuel P. Huntington, The 
Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); 
Keith Darden and Anna Grzymala-Busse, “The Great Divide: Literacy, Nationalism, and the 
Communist Collapse,” World Politics 59 (October 2006), 83-115. 
12 Lerner. 
13 Lipset. 
14 Wolfgang Knöbl, “Theories That Won't Pass Away: The Never-ending Story of 
Modernization Theory,” in Gerard Delanty and Engin F. Isin, eds., Handbook of Historical 
Sociology (London: Sage, 2003), 96-107; Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, “How 
Development Leads to Democracy: What We Know About Modernization,” Foreign Affairs 88 
(March / April 2009), 33-48. 
15 Guillermo A.O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1979). For a discussion see Knöbl; Tatu Vanhanen, Prospects 
of Democracy: A Study of 172 Countries (London: Routledge, 1997). 
16 Vanhanen, 19979, p. 52.  
17 Carles Boix, Democracy and Redistribution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2003). 
18 Michael Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?,” World Politics 53 (April 2001), 325-61. 
19 Ben Ansell and David Samuels, “Inequality and Democratization: A Contractarian 
Approach,” Comparative Political Studies 43 (July 2010), 1543-74; Boix; Boix and Stokes. 
20 Epstein et al., p. 552. 
21 Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After 
the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); David Collier and Steven 
Levitsky, “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research,” 
Word Politics 49 (April 1997), 430-51; Andreas Schedler, The Politics of Uncertainty: 
Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013). 
22 Epstein et al., p. 551. 
23 Ibid., p. 555. 
24 Lipset. 




                                                                                                                                                                                     
27 Epstein et al., p. 557. 
28 Lipset. 
29 Julian Wucherpfennig and Franziska Deutsch, “Modernization and Democracy: Theories 
and Evidence Revisited,” Living Reviews in Democracy 1 (2009), 1-9. 
30 Frye et al. 
31 Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich K. Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-communist 
Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 158. 
32 Bela Greskovits, “Legacies of Industrialization and Paths of Transnational Integration after 
Socialism,” in Stephen Kotkin and Mark R. Beissinger, eds., Historical Legacies of 
Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 
69. 
33 Olivier Blanchard and Michael R. Kremer, “Disorganization,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 112 (November 1997), 1091-126. 
34 See also Boix, pp. 76-77. 
35 Jakub M. Goldzimirski, The Political Economy of Russian Aluminum (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan: 2018); for a discussion of rapid Soviet urbanization, see also Clifford G. Gaddy, 
“Room for Error: The Economic Legacy of Soviet Spatial Misallocation,” in Stephen Kotkin 
and Mark R. Beissinger, eds., Historical Legacies of Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 52-67. 
36 Sarah Ashwin, “Endless Patience: Explaining Soviet and Post-Soviet Social Stability,” 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31 (June 1998), 187-98. 
37 Olga Tkach, “The Phenomenon of the ‘Soviet Hereditary Worker': From Asseveration of 
Social Class Purity to Workers’ Dynasty,” in Timo Vihavainen, ed., The Soviet Union—A 
Popular State? Studies on Popular Opinion in the USSR (St. Petersburg: Evropeiskii Dom, 
2003), 162-79. 
38 Beth Mitcheneck and David A. Plane, “Migration and the Quasi-Labor Market in Russia,” 
International Regional Science Review 19 (1995), 267-88. 
39 Grzegorz Ekiert and Stephen E. Hanson, “Time, Space, and Institutional Change in Central 
and Eastern Europe,” in Grzegorz Ekiert and Stephen E. Hanson, eds., Capitalism and 
Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe: Assessing the Legacy of Communist Rule (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 15-48. 
40 Ibid., p. 19. 
41 Alena V. Ledeneva, Russia's Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
42 Joseph S. Berliner, Factory and Manager in the USSR (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1957). 
43 Ibid. 
44 Jowitt, pp. 289-290. 
45 Hale, 2015, pp. 9-10. 
46 Susan Stokes, “Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence 
from Argentina,” American Political Science Review 99 (August 2005), 315-25; Herbert 
Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, Correlates of Clientelism: Political Economy, Politicized 
Ethnicity and Post-Communist Transition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); 
Edward L. Gibson, “Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Democratic 
Countries,” World Politics 58 (October 2005), 101-32; Beatriz Magaloni, Alberto Diaz-
Cayeros, and Federico Estévez, “Clientelism and Portfolio Diversification: A Model of 
Electoral Investment with Applications to Mexico,” in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. 
Wilkinson, eds., Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and 
Political Competition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 182-205. Susan Stokes 
defines clientelism as “the proffering of material goods in return for electoral support, where 
the criterion of distribution . . . is simply: did you (will you) support me?” (Susan Stokes, 
51 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
“Political Clientelism,” in Carles Boix and Susan Stokes, eds., The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 604-27, p. 605. 
47 Hale, 2015; Frye et al., 2014. 
48 Stokes, 2007; Magaloni et al. 2007; Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, “Citizen-
Political Linkages: An Introduction,” in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson, eds., 
Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1-49; Fabrice Edouard Lehoucq and Iván 
Molina Jiménez, Stuffing the Ballot Box: Fraud, Electoral Reform, and Democratization in 
Costa Rica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
49 Frye et al., 2014, p. 197; see also Henry E. Hale, “Correlates of Clientelism: Political 
Economy, Politicized Ethnicity and Post-Communist Transition,” in Herbert Kitschelt and 
Steven I. Wilkinson, eds., Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability 
and Political Competition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 227-50; Natalya 
Zubarevich, “Chetyre Rossii,” Vedomosti, Dec. 30, 2011. 
50 Frye et al., 2014, p. 196. 
51 Stephen Crowley, “Between Class and Nation: Worker Politics in the New Ukraine,” 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 28 (1995), 43-69. 
52 Hale, 2015, p. 99; see also Sarah Birch, “Nomenklatura Democratization: Electoral 
Clientelism in Post-Soviet Ukraine,” Democratization 4 (1997), 40-62. 
53 Rabochaya gazeta, Oct. 22, 2011. 
54 Donetsk.Kommentarii, Nov. 5, 2011. 
55 Ukrainskaya pravda, Nov. 30, 2015. 
56 Charters Wynn, Workers, Strikes and Pogroms: The Donbass-Dnieper Bend in Late 
Imperial Russia, 1870-1905 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). 
57 This section is largely based on: Sergei I. Zhuk, Rock and Roll in the Rocket City: The West, 
Identity, and Ideology in Soviet Dniepropetrovsk, 1960-1985 (Washington: Woodrow Wilson 
Center Press; The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010). 
58 Ibid. 
59 The role of Soviet-era networks is discussed in: John Willerton, Patronage and Politics in 
the USSR (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
60 Zhuk, p. 5. 
61 Wilson, 2014, p. 42. 
62 Ibid., p. 42. 
63 “Dnepropetrovskiy klan,” Freelance Bureau, Feb. 16, 2002. http://flb.ru/info/5566.html 
(accessed 5 December 2016). 
64 Wilson, 2014, p. 42. 
65 Hale 2015, p. 325, emphasis original. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Andrew Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2014). 
68 Mikhail Myagkov, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Dimitri Shakin, The Forensics of Electoral 
Fraud: Russia and Ukraine (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Erik S.Herron and 
Paul E. Johnson, “It Doesn't Matter Who Votes, But Who Counts The Votes: Assessing Fraud 
In Ukraine's 2002 Parliamentary Elections,” Unpublished Manuscript, 2003. 
69 Guy Chazan and Roman Olearchyk, “Ukraine: An Oligarch Brought to Heel,” Financial 
Times, 25 March 2015. https://www.ft.com/content/b0b04474-d232-11e4-a225-00144feab7de 
(accessed 30 August 2017).  
70 “Spor Kolomoyskogo i Nayoma o reyderskom zakhvate Ukrnafty,” Ria Novosti Ukraina, 




                                                                                                                                                                                     
71 Elena Solomina, “Dnepropetrovsk: Nevidimoye prisutstviye Kolomoyskogo,” Ria Novosti 
Ukraina, 5 January 2016 http://rian.com.ua/analytics/20160105/1003118883.html (accessed 30 
August 2017). 
72 We drop Kyiv, which has the status of national capital and which we excluded from rayon-
level analysis due to administrative incompatibility of within-city rayony with municipalities 
elsewhere in Ukraine. 
73 Employing oblast-level data, we can also perform tests addressing the potential concern that 
the 2015 elections may not be fully representative of electoral patterns over time. Employing 
oblast-level data for several electoral cycles, we can confirm that the territorial distribution of 
voting patterns remains relatively stable over time (see SA2).  
74 Vanhanen, 1997: Tatu Vanhanen, “A New Dataset for Measuring Democracy, 1810-1998,” 
Journal of Peace Research 37 (March 2000), 251-65. 
75 Tomila Lankina and Lullit Getachew, “A Geographic Incremental Theory of 
Democratization: Territory, Aid and Democracy in Postcommunist Regions,” World Politics 
58 (July 2006), 536-82. 
76 Vanhanen 1997, p. 37. 
77 We prefer this measure over measures capturing vote for a particular party. Party preferences 
are not the best guide for ascertaining regional quality of the electoral processes, not least 
because in Ukrainian politics, contending candidates may be associated with rival oligarchic 
groups. See also: Clem and Craumer; John O'Loughlin, “The Regional Factor in Contemporary 
Ukrainian Politics: Scale, Place, Space, or Bogus Effect?,” Post-Soviet Geography and 
Economics 42 (2001), 1-33; Ivan Katchanovski, “Regional Political Divisions in Ukraine in 
1991–2006,” Nationalities Papers 34 (November 2006), 507-32; Paul Kubicek, “Regional 
Polarisation in Ukraine: Public Opinion, Voting and Legislative Behaviour,” Europe-Asia 
Studies 52 (2000), 273-94. 
78 Fabrice Edouard Lehoucq, “Electoral fraud: Causes, types, and consequences,” Annual 
Review of Political Science 6 (2003), 233-56; Rodion Skovoroda and Tomila Lankina, 
“Fabricating Votes for Putin: New Tests of Fraud and Electoral Manipulations from Russia,” 
Post-Soviet Affairs 33 (2017), 100-23; Pippa Norris, Why Electoral Integrity Matters 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Andreas Schedler, “The Menu of 
Manipulation,” Journal of Democracy 13 (April 2002), 47-59. 
79 Vanhanen, 1997, p. 35. In the same study, Vanhanen discusses measures capturing 
peculiarities of socialist economies that may impinge on democratic development, namely “the 
relative concentration and distribution of the means of production in non-agricultural sectors of 
the economy” (1997, p. 51). He defines concentration as “important economic resources [are] 
owned or controlled by the few, usually a more or less coherent social or political group. The 
controlling group may be a group of individuals, a group of big corporations (domestic or 
foreign-owned), a group of public enterprises, or a party controlling the state and through it the 
means of production owned by the state” (p. 52). In discussing this measure, Vanhanen had 
been however concerned with its failure to account for democratization in Eastern Europe in 
the early 1990s, rather than to explain how the structural legacies of industrial concentration 
may account for democratic backsliding in the period that followed the publication of his book 
in 1997.  
80 Tomila Lankina and Lullit Getachew, “Mission or Empire, Word or Sword? The Human 
Capital Legacy in Post-Colonial Democratic Development,” American Journal of Political 
Science 56 (April 2012), 465-83; Caroline Beer and Neil J. Mitchell, “Comparing Nations and 
States: Human Rights and Democracy in India,” Comparative Political Studies 39 (October 
2006), 996-1018; Michael Coppedge, Angel Alvarez, and Claudia Maldonado, “Two Persistent 




                                                                                                                                                                                     
81 In the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasti, elections did not take place in the separatists-controlled 
territories, which include the capital cities of both regions, and in the conflict zones; elections 
also did not take place in Crimea and Sevastopol. We exclude these territories from our analysis 
due to missing data. Our “competition” sub-indicator is based on the precise share of votes 
obtained by parties, rather than on the allocation of seats in the rada. This is because in some 
cases several parties with slightly different vote shares obtained the same number of seats. The 
party’s exact vote share therefore represents a more straightforward measure for calculating the 
EQ sub-indicator. 
82 The Odessa oblast represents one of the most striking cases. The oblast-level Vanhanen 
score is 33.16, while in the city of Izmail, the score is twice as low and has the value of 16.49 
Izmail is located in the Western part of the oblast and is among the relatively few Ukrainian 
districts where the majority of the population is ethnically Russian. Izmail’s Soviet-era 
industries have been in decline. 
83 The dummy captures the potentially non-linear effect of development in that while small 
changes in the size of urban population in the mostly rural rayony may have little or no effect 
on regional EQ, we may observe significant voting differences among the metropolitan centers 
(rayon-free cities) and the rest of the country. 
84 The first dummy variable takes the value of one if 10 percent or more of the rayon population 
claims Russian as native language. The second dummy variable takes the value of one if 10 
percent or more of the rayon population speaks a different, non-Russian and non-Ukrainian, 
native language. These rayony are concentrated in three oblasti: Transcarpatia, which has a 
large Hungarian minority; the Western part of the Odessa oblast, which counts Bulgarians and 
Moldovans among its ethnic minority groups; and Chernivitsy, which has sizeable Moldovan 
and Romanian populations. 
85 The reason why we need the dummy measure is because the culturally-driven effects in 
politics could emerge only if the linguistic minority group is sufficiently large: small changes 
in the linguistic composition would have no effect, but major variation between regions with a 
small and with a large minority share would matter. Nevertheless, it is also possible that even 
small changes matter. Employing two regression specifications therefore would help establish 
the robustness of our results. 
86 For robustness checks, we also employ urbanization data for two additional time periods in 
Ukraine’s post-World War II Soviet history: 1959, corresponding to the early Khrushchev 
period, and 1970 corresponding to the early Brezhnev era. 
87 We regard this measure as a proxy for the extent to which the national leadership prioritized 
specific geographic areas as part of its developmental drive. Again, data for this variable 
correspond to the so-called Stagnation Era by which time we observe significantly higher levels 
of bureaucratic continuity and stability as compared to the earlier periods in Soviet history. In 
Ukraine, the share of CPSU members in individual oblasti varied substantially, from more than 
8 percent of the total population in Kyiv, to a mere 1 percent in Ivano-Frankivsk. On the CPSU 
legacies see Lankina, Libman and Obydenkova; Alexander Libman and Anastassia 
Obydenkova, “CPSU Legacies and Regional Development in Contemporary Russia,” Political 
Studies 63 (2015), 173-90. 
88 The last dataset excludes Western Ukraine, which had been at that time under Polish and 
Romanian rule. In the East, there were substantially fewer oblasti than there are today. Ukraine 
consisted of seven oblasti (including Donetsk) and the Moldovan Autonomous Republic 
(currently part of Moldova). We therefore employ the following approach. We computed an 
average EQ score for all of the present-day oblasti which belonged to a single oblast in 1933 
and correlated this variable with the 1933 industrial output data. Cherkasy and Kherson oblasti 




                                                                                                                                                                                     
89 In the rayon-level analysis, we exclude Kyiv, where administrative sub-divisions are based 
on a different principle than in entities with the status of oblast. 
90 Furthermore, in SA11 we replicate our analysis of the effect of the conventional economic 
development indicators and of the East-West divide on electoral quality using oblast level data 
instead of rayony. We also experiment with employing four economic development proxies for 
which rayon-level data are not available. Our developmental indicators are robustly and 
negatively correlated with EQ. 
91 We also employ the correlation coefficient with two components of the Vanhanen index, 
participation and competition, but obtain results similar to those obtained when employing the 
composite index. 
92 We consider Odessa oblast to be part of Eastern Ukraine, although it includes the territories 
of Budzhak, which had been under Romanian rule in the interwar period. Budzhak accounts for 
roughly 25 percent of the oblast population (2001 Census). 
93 The role of post-Soviet trade in the context of the regime transition is discussed in: Tomila 
Lankina, Alexander Libman and Anastassia Obydenkova, “Authoritarian and Democratic 
Diffusion in Postcommunist Regions,” Comparative Political Studies 49 (2016), 1599-629. 
94 Graeme B. Robertson, “Strikes and Labor Organization in Hybrid Regimes,” American 
Political Science Review 101 (November 2007), 781-98; Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov, and 
Andrei Riabov, Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political 
Reform (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004); Vladimir Gel'man 
and Grigorii V. Golosov, “Regional Party System Formation in Russia: The Deviant Case of 
Sverdlovsk Oblast,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 14 (1998), 31-53; 
Tomila Lankina, “President Putin's Local Government Reforms,” in Peter Reddaway and 
Robert W. Orttung, The Dynamics of Russian Politics: Putin's Reform of Federal-Regional 
Relations (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005); William M. Reisinger and Bryon J. 
Moraski, The Regional Roots of Russia's Political Regime (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 2017). 
95 Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, Political Consequences of Crony Capitalism Inside Russia (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011). 
96 Heiko Pleines, “Dataset on Ukrainian Oligarchs 2000-2015,” 2016, 
https://www.forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.de/UserFiles/file/table-oligarchs-overview.xls 
(accessed 20 June 2018); Heiko Pleines, “Oligarchs and Politics in Ukraine”, Demokratizatsiya 
24 (Winter 2016), 105-27. 
97 Frye et al.  
98 Epstein et al.  
99 Przeworski et al., 2001; Doh Chull Shin and Hannah June Kim, “Liberal Democracy as the 
End of History: Western Theories versus Eastern Asian Realities,” Asian Journal of 
Comparative Politics 2 (2017), 133-53; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs, 
“Development and Democracy,” Foreign Affairs 84 (September – October 2005), 77-86. 
 
 
